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is hard to see because much of what administrators do is hard to see, and because the
significance of some administrative interpretations only becomes apparent over time.
This Article expands the archive, by alerting legal scholars to fine-grained historical
research on Americans’ encounters with administrative agencies. This body of
work—coming largely out of history departments—is particularly attentive to the
experiences of marginalized and non-elite populations. And although the historians
writing in this vein have not always emphasized the constitutional aspects of their
stories, those aspects are there between the lines. By analyzing two examples—the
Freedmen’s Bureau’s interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment and immigration
oﬃcials’ interpretation of the Fifth Amendment due process guarantee—this Article
demonstrates what historians have to oﬀer the study of administrative
constitutionalism, both empirically and normatively. American history, this research
reminds us, is about competing constitutional visions. Administrators helped pick
winners and losers in an ongoing battle for formal legitimacy.
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INTRODUCTION
This symposium builds on a decade of scholarship on the role of
administrative agencies in constructing and elaborating constitutional
meaning—a phenomenon we now call “administrative constitutionalism.”1
Drawing on scattered evidence from across the contemporary administrative
state, as well as a discrete set of historical case studies, legal scholars have
made this phenomenon visible and intelligible. Sophia Lee’s pathbreaking
work explored the way that administrators in the Federal Communications
Commission, the Federal Power Commission, and the National Labor
Relations Board, respectively, interpreted the constitutional requirement of
equal protection in the labor and employment arena between the 1930s and

1 See Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the
Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 801 (2010) (using the term to refer to “regulatory
agencies’ interpretation and implementation of constitutional law”). Other scholars deﬁne the term
diﬀerently. I employ Lee’s formulation.
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the 1970s.2 Risa Goluboﬀ, Anjali Dalal, and Eric Fish have separately
examined the role of the Department of Justice in deﬁning the scope of
constitutional civil rights and liberties.3 Joy Milligan and I have done the
same for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (the precursor
of what is now the Department of Education and the Department of Health
and Human Services).4 Mining federal regulations and appellate court
decisions, Gillian Metzger has found contemporary examples of
administrative constitutionalism in the work of the federal Department of
Housing and Urban Development, the Food and Drug Administration, and
the Oﬃce of Legal Counsel.5 Other legal scholars have identiﬁed signiﬁcant
constitutional interpretations coming from the U.S. Post Oﬃce,6 the Federal
Radio Commission,7 the Social Security Administration,8 and the War
Department.9 And a raft of recent work illuminates how bureaucrats outside
the federal government, at the state and local levels, have engaged questions
of constitutional signiﬁcance.10
See id.; see also SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL
NEW RIGHT (2014). For another example of pathbreaking early work on administrative
constitutionalism, employing a broader understanding of the term, see WILLIAM ESKRIDGE &
JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010).
3 RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007); Anjali S. Dalal, Shadow
Administrative Constitutionalism and the Creation of Surveillance Culture, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 59
(2014); Eric S. Fish, Prosecutorial Constitutionalism, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 237 (2017).
4 Joy Milligan, Plessy Preserved: Agencies and the Eﬀective Constitution, YALE L.J. (forthcoming);
Joy Milligan, Subsidizing Segregation, 104 VA. L. REV. 847 (2018); Karen M. Tani, Administrative Equal
Protection: Federalism, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Rights of the Poor, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 825
(2015).
5 Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (2013). For a recent
article that also looks at multiple agencies—including the Department of Education and the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”)—and focuses speciﬁcally on costs to
constitutionally protected speech, see David E. Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws and the
Administrative State: A Skeptic’s Look at Administrative Constitutionalism, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1381 (2019). On administrative constitutionalism at HUD, see Blake Emerson, Aﬃrmatively
Furthering Equal Protection: Constitutional Meaning in the Administration of Fair Housing, 65 BUFF. L.
REV. 163 (2017). See also Lewis A. Grossman, AIDS Activists, FDA Regulation, and the Amendment of
America’s Drug Constitution, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 687, 691, 699-734 (2016) (characterizing the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act as America’s “drug constitution” and illuminating the politics that animated
administrative interpretations of that statute in the late 1980s and 1990s).
6 Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires: The Post Oﬃce and the Birth of Communications
Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553 (2007).
7 Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the
Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1, 43-51 (2000).
8 Tani, supra note 4.
9 Jeremy K. Kessler, The Administrative Origins of Modern Civil Liberties Law, 114 COLUM. L.
REV. 1083 (2014).
10 See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 5; Marie-Amélie George, Agency Nullification: Defying Bans on
Gay and Lesbian Foster and Adoptive Parents, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 363 (2016) (identifying
state and local bureaucrats as important actors in the discursive shift that led ultimately to
constitutionally recognized marriage equality for gay and lesbian citizens); Marie-Amélie George,
2
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Many of these legal scholars have also tackled normative questions,
starting with those of greatest salience to the ﬁeld of American public law:
What does the phenomenon of administrative constitutionalism mean for a
system of government that is democratic, federalist, and committed to
separation of powers? In such a system, are agencies legitimate and
appropriate interpreters of constitutional meaning?11
This Article places that scholarship into conversation with a robust strand
of historical research on Americans’ everyday experiences with law and
government, including administrative agencies. Contributors to this strand
of research—which has generally come out of history departments—display
little interest in the questions about institutional competency and democratic
accountability that drive many legal scholars. But through careful and creative
archival research, they have documented administrative constitutionalism in
action. Their ﬁndings oﬀer legal scholars not only a broader empirical
foundation, but also a diﬀerent and important set of questions: Who has
reaped the beneﬁts of administrative constitutionalism and who has borne its
burdens? How have agencies used the Constitution to shape and police the
“borders of belonging” that have ﬁgured so crucially in American life?12
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains why historians have
been well positioned to see administrative constitutionalism in action (even
if they remain uninterested in it as a legal phenomenon). The two subsequent
parts oﬀer extended examples. Part II discusses the Freedmen’s Bureau’s
interpretations of the terms “slavery” and “involuntary servitude”—practices
that the Thirteenth Amendment barred but did not deﬁne. Part III turns to
federal immigration oﬃcials’ interpretation of the Fifth Amendment
guarantee of due process in the late nineteenth century, amidst struggles over
Chinese immigration. Part IV concludes with a discussion of why historians’
questions—not simply their ﬁndings—enrich the study of administrative
constitutionalism and one of its parent ﬁelds, administrative law. Unlike
Bureaucratic Agency: Administering the Transformation of LGBT Rights, 36 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 83
(2017) (applying an administrative constitutionalism lens to the actions of state and local bureaucrats
grappling with the equality rights of gay and lesbian citizens); Joanna L. Grisinger, Municipal
Administrative Constitutionalism: The New York City Commission on Human Rights, Foreign Policy, and
the First Amendment, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1669 (2019).
11 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 2; Metzger, supra note 5; Bertrall L. Ross II,
Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 519 (2015). For an excellent distillation
of what existing historical case studies oﬀer these normative debates, see Sophia Z. Lee, From the
History to the Theory of Administrative Constitutionalism, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM THE
INSIDE OUT: ESSAYS ON THEMES IN THE WORK OF JERRY L. MASHAW 109 (Nicholas R. Parrillo
ed., 2017).
12 The term “borders of belonging” comes from Barbara Welke’s scholarship on the lines of
exclusion and inclusion that have deﬁned citizenship in the United States. See generally BARBARA
YOUNG WELKE, LAW AND THE BORDERS OF BELONGING IN THE LONG NINETEENTH
CENTURY UNITED STATES (2010).
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many scholars of administrative law, historians tend not to focus on how
agencies should make decisions, or how much power agencies should have visà-vis other governmental institutions. Their interest, rather, is how
administrators wielded the power of the state to aﬀect people on the
ground—materially, politically, socially, and otherwise—and how people who
were subject to regulation in turn aﬀected the content and limits of
administrative action. Historians’ work thus oﬀers a useful reminder of the
stakes of administrative law. These stakes include not only the legitimacy and
jurisdiction of the so-called fourth branch but also the chances and choices of
everyone it touches.
I. HISTORIANS AS EXCAVATORS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM
A deﬁning trait of scholarship on administrative constitutionalism,
according to Gillian Metzger, is a “conceptual commitment to seeing
constitutional law in ordinary law contexts.”13 When it comes to the “ordinary
law” of administrative agencies, however, “seeing” is not so easy. Much of
what agencies do is insulated from the broader public and unlikely to attract
the attention of Congress, the courts, or the White House. By extension, a
vast amount of administrative activity is not visible in the types of sources
that legal scholars most often consult—legislative records, regulations,
published court opinions, and the like. Further hindering visibility is the
subtlety of some administrative interpretations of the Constitution.14 Only in
the fullness of time does their signiﬁcance become apparent.15
All of these factors suggest the value of a historical approach, one that
looks back on an agency’s work and recovers evidence of day-to-day
administration. And as it turns out, historians have been doing this very work,
albeit not with administrative constitutionalism in their sight lines.
Importantly, many of the historians doing this work are also committed
to the ordinary—or at least, to counterbalancing generations of prior
scholarship that privileged elite perspectives and formal politics. They
entered the profession when cultural history was ascendant and social history
established; as a result, they see value in studying people whose low status or
limited access to formal power may have prevented them from “making
Metzger, supra note 5, at 1912.
Id. at 1902.
Id. at 1932; see also Lee, supra note 1, at 883 (noting that administrative constitutionalism is
“not necessarily divulged” in the formal opinions, orders, and rules that are most accessible to legal
scholars). On the wide range of administrative decisions that occur without triggering the
accountability and oversight procedures that might create greater visibility, see M. Elizabeth Magill,
Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383 (2004), and Edward Rubin, It’s Time to
Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95 (2003).
13
14
15
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history” in the traditional sense.16 Under the now dominant approach to
studying political history, what counts as politics includes much more than
contests over political leadership, and history’s “losers” often merit as much
attention as the “winners.”17 Legal history has long since moved in the same
direction—beyond the mandarins of the bench and bar and toward an
approach that emphasizes law’s messy and sometimes unpredictable
encounters with the people it presumes to govern.18
These trends are relevant here because they have resulted in deep and
creative readings of the detritus of administrative agencies—including from
time periods that predate the modern administrative state (as conventionally
understood).19 Historian Gautham Rao, for example, has mined the day-today records of custom houses in the early national period to illuminate the
waxing and waning of distinct visions of governance.20 Historian Cathleen
Cahill has used the archives of the U.S. Indian Service to provide a revisionist
account of the modern administrative state itself, pegging its origins not to
Gilded Age railroad regulation or to the New Deal but to an older project of
settler colonialism.21
Twentieth-century regulatory innovations have provided even richer
fodder for historians. Margot Canaday has drawn on records from the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Selective Service System, and
the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, among many other agencies,
to show how contemporary understandings of homosexuality took shape and
how the label “homosexual” came to signal the citizen’s quintessential
16 For a brisk summary of major trends in historical writing across the twentieth century,
including the rise of social and cultural history, see Sean Wilentz, American Political Histories, 21
OAH MAG. HIST. 23 (2007).
17 See generally THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT: NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN
POLITICAL HISTORY (Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak & Julian E. Zelizer eds., 2003).
18 On these general trends, see William E. Forbath, Hendrik Hartog & Martha Minow,
Introduction: Legal Histories from Below, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 759; Robert W. Gordon, J. Willard Hurst
and the Common Law Tradition in American Legal Historiography, 10 L. & SOC’Y REV. 9 (1975); and
Risa Goluboﬀ, Lawyers, Law, and the New Civil Rights Historiography, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2312 (2013)
(reviewing KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS LAWYER (2012)).
19 Some of the people I have described as legal scholars are also ﬁrst-rate historians. Situated
in law schools, they are nonetheless in dialogue with professional historians and deeply committed
to the methods of the discipline. The historical work that I draw from in this Article comes primarily
from historians who have made their institutional home in history departments and, for the most
part, lack formal legal training.
20 GAUTHAM RAO, NATIONAL DUTIES: CUSTOM HOUSES AND THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN STATE (2016).
21 CATHLEEN D. CAHILL, FEDERAL FATHERS AND MOTHERS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES INDIAN SERVICE, 1869–1933 (2011). Political scientist Stephen Rockwell has
advanced a similar argument. STEPHEN J. ROCKWELL, INDIAN AFFAIRS AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2010).
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“other.”22 Michael Willrich used the records of Chicago’s agency-like
municipal courts to explore Progressive-Era tactics for governing poor and
working-class Americans.23 From the records of the federal Oﬃce of War
Information, among other agencies, James Sparrow documented how
Americans grew acclimated to a much more visible and powerful federal
government during and after World War II.24 Studying the military as a
bureaucracy (speciﬁcally, the military chaplaincy), Ronit Stahl has shown how
the modern American state managed religious pluralism and, over time, built
“state-sponsored American religion.”25 The list could continue.26 These
scholars might not describe their work as histories of administrative
governance, and yet that is what they have illuminated, in fine-grained detail.27
22 MARGOT CANADAY, THE STRAIGHT STATE: SEXUALITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2009). For a fuller account of the many agencies and
bureaucratic actors that have regulated sex and sexuality in U.S. history, see Melissa Murray &
Karen Tani, Something Old, Something New: Reflections on the Sex Bureaucracy, 27 CALIF. L. REV.
ONLINE 122, 127-40 (2016).
23 MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE ERA
CHICAGO (2003).
24 JAMES T. SPARROW, WARFARE STATE: WORLD WAR II AMERICANS AND THE AGE OF
BIG GOVERNMENT (2011).
25 RONIT Y. STAHL, ENLISTING FAITH: HOW THE MILITARY CHAPLAINCY SHAPED
RELIGION AND STATE IN MODERN AMERICA 14 (2017).
26 Scholars of Native history, immigration history, social welfare history, and civil rights
history have made especially eﬀective and creative use of administrative records. For Native history,
see, for example, CAHILL, supra note 21; CHRISTOPHER D. HAVEMAN, RIVERS OF SAND: CREEK
INDIAN EMIGRATION, RELOCATION, AND ETHNIC CLEANSING IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH
(2016); and MARGARET D. JACOBS, WHITE MOTHER TO A DARK RACE: SETTLER
COLONIALISM, MATERNALISM, AND THE REMOVAL OF INDIGENOUS CHILDREN IN THE
AMERICAN WEST AND AUSTRALIA, 1880–1940 (2009). For immigration history, see, for example,
CANADAY, supra note 22; S. DEBORAH KANG, THE INS ON THE LINE: MAKING U.S.
IMMIGRATION LAW ON THE US-MEXICO BORDER, 1917–1954 (2017); ERIKA LEE, AT AMERICA’S
GATES: CHINESE IMMIGRATION DURING THE EXCLUSION ERA, 1882–1943 (2003); DEIRDRE M.
MOLONEY, NATIONAL INSECURITIES: IMMIGRANTS AND U.S. DEPORTATION POLICY SINCE
1882 (2012); MAE NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN AMERICA (2004); and LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE
IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW (1995). For work on welfare
bureaucracy, see, for example, FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS:
POLITICS AND POVERTY IN MODERN AMERICA (2007); LISA LEVENSTEIN, A MOVEMENT
WITHOUT MARCHES: AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF POVERTY IN
POSTWAR PHILADELPHIA (2009); and KAREN M. TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY: WELFARE,
RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN GOVERNANCE, 1935–1972 (2016). For work on the bureaucracy of civil
rights enforcement and its obverse, the bureaucracy of segregation, see, for example, GOLUBOFF,
supra note 3; LEE, supra note 2; PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION
LAW AND THE MAKING OF RACE IN AMERICA (2009); and KATHERINE TURK, EQUALITY ON
TRIAL: GENDER AND RIGHTS IN THE MODERN AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2016).
27 This Article foregrounds historical work, but I would be remiss if I did not mention social
science research that draws on administrative records and implicates constitutionally protected
rights and values. See, e.g., Jennifer Carlson, The Hidden Arm of the Law: Examining Administrative
Justice in Gun Carrying Licensing, 51 L. & SOC’Y REV. 346 (2017) (analyzing the workings and
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In some cases, historians have also illuminated administrative interpretations
of the Constitution—albeit without naming those interpretations as such. The
subsequent Parts oﬀer two dramatic and consequential examples. Taken
together, these examples showcase the raw material that historians have to
oﬀer legal scholars, as well as the normative value of engaging with their
ﬁndings. Recovering the experiences of marginalized and non-elite people,
many now long dead, might not lead to any particular policy prescription for
the present-day administrative state, but it foregrounds the human stakes.
II. THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND THE MEANING OF
“INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE”
A natural starting point for this exercise is the Civil War: In the wake of
that great conﬂict, the legal landscape changed dramatically (even if on the
ground, much remained the same). A fundamental feature of this new
landscape was the Thirteenth Amendment, passed by the Republicandominated U.S. Congress on January 31, 1865, and ratiﬁed the following
December. The amendment abolished both slavery and “involuntary
servitude” throughout the United States, “except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.”28
In one sense, the meaning of these words was plain. The institution of
slavery was dead. Emancipation was no longer a matter of politics or wartime
strategy, but of formal constitutional law. In another sense, however, these words
were ambiguous. What conditions amounted to “involuntary servitude”?29 It
decisions of county-level gun boards); Vicki Lens et al., Choreographing Justice: Administrative Law
Judges and the Management of Welfare Disputes, 40 J.L. & SOC’Y 199 (2013) (analyzing administrative
“fair hearings” in the welfare context); Keramet Reiter, Reclaiming the Power to Punish: Legislating and
Administrating the California Supermax, 1982–1989, 50 L. & SOC’Y REV. 484 (2016) (drawing on
interviews with prison administrators, among other sources).
28 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
29 Many works of legal scholarship have attempted to discern what the framers of the
Amendment meant by “involuntary servitude.” See, e.g., JAMES D. SCHMIDT, FREE TO WORK:
LABOR LAW, EMANCIPATION, AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1815–1880, at 116-17 (1998) (arguing that
the drafters likely understood the “involuntary servitude” clause as a guarantee that workers would
“be free to choose individual employers” and that “negotiations over remuneration and conditions
of employment” would “be unfettered”); Nathan B. Oman, Specific Performance and the Thirteenth
Amendment, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2020, 2024, 2065-66 (2009) (arguing that to the framers, the term
likely had a relatively clear meaning, based on “more than seventy years of legal practice,” but also
noting that the term received “very little attention” during congressional debates and that
“revolutionary aspirations” were in the air); Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth
Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 448-50, 452-53 (1989) (noting a range of views among the
framers and arguing that Congress did not give “substance and meaning to the term ‘involuntary
servitude’ [until] after passing the amendment,” because the term could really only be deﬁned “in
the context of the post-slavery state”); see also Michael Les Benedict, Constitutional Politics,
Constitutional Law, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 71 MD. L. REV. 163, 187 (2011) (“Exactly what
freedom meant was an argument for another day.”); James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom
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would be nearly two decades before the Supreme Court handed down the
“badges and incidents” language familiar to us today30 (and even that
language is ambiguous).31 One thing was clear, however: Given the vast
inequalities of power between formerly enslaved people and those who had
enslaved them, as well as between wage laborers and employers more generally,
the precise content of the Thirteenth Amendment was a pressing question.
The answer, in the first instance, came neither from Congress nor from
the courts,32 but from a new administrative agency, housed within the War
Department: the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands—
commonly known as the Freedmen’s Bureau.33 Established by Congress on
March 3, 1865, the Freedmen’s Bureau was in charge of managing all the lands
that were conﬁscated, captured, or abandoned during the war.34 Congress also
of Labor in the Constitutional Law of “Involuntary Servitude,” 119 YALE L.J. 1474, 1481-87, 1491 (2010)
(arguing that there was no consensus among the framers of the Thirteenth Amendment regarding
whether it protected “the right to quit”). A related but distinct question was what the bounds were
of Congress’s authority under the Enabling Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIII, § 2 (giving Congress the “power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation”).
30 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (holding that § 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment empowered Congress “to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges
and incidents of slavery in the United States”). On whether § 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment
directly bans the “badges and incidents of slavery,” see James Gray Pope, Section 1 of the Thirteenth
Amendment and the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 65 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 426 (2018).
31 See Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 14 J. CONST. L.
561, 564 (2012) (noting that, despite post-1883 elaborations of the badges-and-incidents phrase, there
remains “no generally accepted understanding as to [its] meaning”); see also Pope, supra note 30, at
465-69, 477 (suggesting that a search for the framers’ understanding of “badges and incidents” would
surface general agreement on the core incidents of slavery, but, beyond that, partisan disagreement).
32 Congress’s ﬁrst pronouncements about the meanings of “slavery” and “involuntary
servitude” were the Slave Kidnapping Act of 1866 and the Peonage Act of 1867. Neither Act,
however, purported to identify the outer bounds of these phrases. Early judicial opinions on this
issue were scarce. One of the earliest was In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (Chase,
C.J.), discussed infra at notes 86-100 and the accompanying text. The Supreme Court’s earliest
elaboration of the term “involuntary servitude” did not occur until 1872, in the Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. 36, 49 (1872). The relative silence of the courts in these early years is consistent with Michael
Les Benedict’s argument that “when Congress proposed and the state legislatures ratiﬁed the
Thirteenth Amendment, they did not conceive that the courts would be the primary agency that
would enforce it.” Benedict, supra note 29, at 176.
33 On the Freedmen’s Bureau as one of the nation’s ﬁrst administrative agencies, albeit one that
has not received much attention from legal scholars, see SCHMIDT, supra note 29. Schmidt also
notes the role of Bureau agents in giving life to the Thirteenth Amendment: “[I]n the months and
years after passage of the Thirteenth Amendment,” they “would attempt . . . to transform its promises
into realities.” Id. at 121. On the Freedmen’s Bureau’s role in answering other vital questions, such as
the legitimacy of freed persons’ family arrangements, see TERA W. HUNTER, BOUND IN WEDLOCK:
SLAVE AND FREE BLACK MARRIAGE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 233-44 (2017); AMY DRU
STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE
AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 44-46 (1998); and Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen:
Reconstruction Era Regulation of African American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251, 279-90 (1999).
34 Randall M. Miller, Introduction, in THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND RECONSTRUCTION:
RECONSIDERATIONS xiii, xv (Paul A. Cimbala & Randall M. Miller eds., 1999).
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gave the Bureau the broad and demanding task of handling all issues relating
to refugees and freed persons.35 At a time when local and state governments
remained hostile to black interests, and when state-level Bureau
commissioners and their local appointees “often constituted the only federal
presence in much of the South,” this authority was signiﬁcant.36 “For newly
freed blacks,” historian Randall Miller has summarized, the Bureau was very
simply “‘the government.’”37
That the Bureau’s work would so directly implicate the Thirteenth
Amendment was not obvious at the agency’s birth, but Reconstruction
politics quickly forced the issue. President Andrew Johnson’s generous pardon
policies eﬀectively precluded Bureau oﬃcials from redistributing land
(because after being pardoned, former slave owners were able to recover their
land).38 This, in turn, meant that formerly enslaved people had little choice
but to work on plantations and farms. Their prospective employers,
meanwhile, were eager for their labor, but not accustomed to paying for it,
nor were they inclined to honor the rights and privileges that many black
workers now demanded.39
In this context, Bureau agents became crucial brokers and adjudicators.40
Their everyday decisions—about what kind of labor arrangements were fair
and what kind of agreements were binding—helped draw a line between labor
relationships that amounted to slavery or involuntary servitude and those
Id.
Id.
Id. Among historians, interest in the Freedmen’s Bureau has surged over the last four
decades. Robert Harrison, New Representations of a ‘Misrepresented Bureau’: Reflections on Recent
Scholarship on the Freedmen’s Bureau, 8 AM. NINETEENTH CENTURY HIST. 205, 205 (2007); see
generally id. (giving a historiographical overview of writing on the Freedmen’s Bureau). See also
MARY FARMER-KAISER, THE FREEDWOMEN AND THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU: RACE, GENDER,
AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE AGE OF EMANCIPATION 1-10 (2010).
38 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at
159-61 (1988).
39 Id.; DONALD G. NIEMAN, TO SET THE LAW IN MOTION: THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU
AND THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF BLACKS, 1865–1868, at xvi (1979). For a detailed examination of the
importance of land to escaping conditions of servitude, see generally CLAUDE F. OUBRE, FORTY
ACRES AND A MULE: THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND BLACK LAND OWNERSHIP (1978).
40 See James D. Schmidt, “A Full-Fledged Government of Men”: Freedmen’s Bureau Labor Policy in
South Carolina, 1865–1868, in THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND RECONSTRUCTION:
RECONSIDERATIONS, supra note 34, at 219, 221 (explaining that when it came to “the legal
boundaries of the employment relation,” local agents of the Bureau “opened some options and closed
others”); see also CHRISTOPHER B. BEAN, TOO GREAT A BURDEN TO BEAR: THE STRUGGLE AND
FAILURE OF THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU IN TEXAS 34 (2016) (noting that the Freedmen’s Bureau
“could have been easily called the Labor Bureau” and that its agents were sometimes referred to as
“employment agents”). A description of the type of people who became Bureau agents and how they
tended to approach their work also appears in James Schmidt and Christopher B. Bean’s respective
works cited above. See also FARMER-KAISER, supra note 37, at 16-24 (providing another overview of
the kinds of people who worked for the Bureau).
35
36
37
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that, while perhaps coercive and unequal, were not unconstitutional.41 This
line was never perfectly clean and sharp, given the lack of uniformity in
Bureau decisionmaking, but it mattered. When legislatures and judges later
attempted to give content to the Thirteenth Amendment’s promises, I explain
below, they did so against this backdrop. And, of course, for people on the
ground, the Bureau was often the last stop on their journey toward
constitutional vindication.
Crucial to my argument is the fact that many freed people were deeply
suspicious of labor contracts, equating them, in the words of one Union
oﬃcer, with “a practical return to slavery.”42 Some freed people also retained
hope of farming on their own account and saw no need to commit themselves
to low-paying, closely supervised labor.43 In the face of these preferences,
Bureau oﬃcials often insisted that freed persons enter contracts and
undermined eﬀorts to pursue alternative, non-contractual arrangements.
Historical accounts are ﬁlled with examples. Consider Bureau assistant
commissioner Thomas Osborn’s response in early 1866 to reports of
underemployed freedmen in Jacksonville, Florida (the men apparently
refused to work for local planters): Osborn ordered the men shipped by rail
to Tallahassee, to labor under contracts that Osborn would draw up for
them.44 In Arkansas, the assistant commissioner did not himself issue such
directives, but “sometimes winked at agents’ use of heavy-handed methods.”45
In Virginia, assistant commissioner Orlando Brown ordered his agents to
41 A similar argument might be made regarding federal military oﬃcers stationed at territorial
outposts and parts of the postwar South. Historian Stacey L. Smith documented an instance in
August 1865 in which a resident of New Mexico territory asked for federal assistance in capturing a
“peon” who had ﬂed his service and the federal oﬃcer refused, claiming that returning a fugitive
debtor to his master would be “contrary to the established rules and regulations of the government
under which we live.” A superior oﬃcer subsequently reversed that decision, reasoning that
“[p]eonage is voluntary and not involuntary servitude.” Stacey L. Smith, Emancipating Peons,
Excluding Coolies: Reconstructing Coercion in the American West, in THE WORLD THE CIVIL WAR
MADE 46, 53-54 (Gregory P. Downs & Kate Masur eds., 2015). Historian Leslie Schwalm has
pointed out that in 1865, in lowcountry South Carolina, military authorities had a larger role than
the Freedmen’s Bureau in “instituting and enforcing the contract labor system.” LESLIE A.
SCHWALM, A HARD FIGHT FOR WE: WOMEN’S TRANSITION FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM IN
SOUTH CAROLINA 171 (1997); see also DANIEL A. NOVAK, THE WHEEL OF SERVITUDE: BLACK
FORCED LABOR AFTER SLAVERY 12 (documenting the role of the Union Army in forcing formerly
enslaved people into labor contracts in 1865).
42 FONER, supra note 38, at 161; see also STANLEY, supra note 33, at 40-42 (noting freedpeople’s
aversion to labor contracts and deep distrust of white employers).
43 STEVEN HAHN, A NATION UNDER OUR FEET: BLACK POLITICAL STRUGGLES IN THE
RURAL SOUTH FROM SLAVERY TO THE GREAT MIGRATION 153 (2003); see also Eric Foner, Rights
and the Constitution in Black Life during the Civil War, 74 J. AM. HIST. 863, 871 (1987) (noting that
“[n]umerous freedmen emerged from slavery convinced they had a ‘right’ to a portion of their former
owners’ land”).
44 NIEMAN, supra note 39, at 164.
45 Id.
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arrest freedmen who refused to accept fair oﬀers of employment and force
those freedmen to labor without compensation on public works.46 The same
threat was implicit in Alabama and Mississippi, where agents reminded
freedmen that if they did not enter contracts, they would be treated as
vagrants under local law—with all the penalties that attached to that status.47
In South Carolina, agents helped evict black laborers who were “squatt[ing]”
on the plantations where they had worked in 1865; those laborers had hoped
to convince planters to rent them land for the 1866 season, but when faced
with eviction, they often acquiesced to less desirable wage or share
contracts.48 This is not to say that Bureau tactics were always so coercive,
because they were not. The point is that Bureau agents strongly encouraged
freed persons—especially men—to enter labor contracts, in a context in which
the balance of power favored employers and in which many employers were
eager to replicate the conditions of slavery.
Simultaneously, Bureau agents failed to support viable alternatives to the
contract labor system. Plausible alternatives for freed persons included
working without contracts, or, with help from Bureau oﬃcials, demanding
that landowners rent them land. Bureau leaders rejected these
alternatives.49 The Bureau might also have offered freed persons direct
economic support, so that they did not feel compelled to enter labor
agreements that replicated the conditions of slavery. Bureau agents
sometimes provided such support to women, historian Mary J. Farmer has
shown, but they excluded men, as part of an overarching “war on
dependency.”50 Facilitating labor contracts was the norm.
In many locations Bureau agents reviewed the contracts and even
provided the terms. Assistant commissioners “stipulated that the Bureau
would recognize as legitimate only written contracts that were fair to
employees” (with fairness a matter for Bureau oﬃcials to decide), historian
Donald Nieman summarizes, and they “strongly recommended that parties
have their contracts approved by agents.”51 Employers had an incentive to
Id. at 165.
Id. at 166-67 (Alabama); id. at 164-65 (Mississippi); NOVAK, supra note 41, at 11 (Mississippi).
NIEMAN, supra note 39, at 167-69.
Id. at 156-59; SCHWALM, supra note 41, at 226-31.
Mary J. Farmer, “Because They Are Women’: Gender and the Virginia Freedmen’s Bureau’s ‘War on
Dependency,” in THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND RECONSTRUCTION: RECONSIDERATIONS, supra
note 34, at 161, 162-63; see also Robert Harrison, Welfare and Employment Policies of the Freedmen’s
Bureau in the District of Columbia, 72 J.S. HIST. 75, 89 (2006) (describing the “rigorously spartan form
of benevolence advocated by the bureau”); JIM DOWNS, SICK FROM FREEDOM: AFRICANAMERICAN ILLNESS AND SUFFERING DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION (2012)
(showing how concerns about dependency constrained the Freedmen’s Bureau’s response to
disability and disease among freed people).
51 NIEMAN, supra note 39, at 163.
46
47
48
49
50
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submit to this process because, at least in 1865, it seemed likely that a Bureau
agent would adjudicate any kind of contract dispute that might arise. When
the Bureau began its work, many states in the former Confederacy still did
not allow African Americans to testify in court, leading to the creation of a
system of Freedmen’s Bureau courts for civil disputes.52 State courts in the
South had regained control over these disputes by the fall of 1866, but Bureau
agents continued to assert jurisdiction as needed.53 In this institutional
context, many employers actually did submit their contracts for Bureau
approval and conform their agreements to Bureau baselines.54
In some regards, freed persons appeared to beneﬁt from the Bureau’s
influence, gaining guarantees that differentiated post-emancipation labor
from slavery. For example, some Bureau officials set wage floors and insisted
that planters disclaim the right to use physical coercion.55 In the sugar region
of Louisiana, Bureau regulations expressly urged freed persons to “obtain the
best terms they can for their service” and insisted that in addition to wages,
freed persons receive such basic necessities as food, clothing, housing, and
medical attention.56
Bureau oﬃcials took no exception, however, to other contract terms that,
in practice, maintained formerly enslaved people in nearly the exact
conditions they had ostensibly escaped. As historian Eric Foner notes,
“[s]ome Bureau oﬃcers approved agreements in which the laborer would
receive nothing at all if the crop failed and could incur ﬁnes for such vaguely
deﬁned oﬀenses as failure to do satisfactory work or ‘imprudent, profane or
indecent language.’”57 And many Bureau-approved contracts provided for
postponement of payment until the crop had been harvested and sold. Such
a “practice not only left share workers penniless in the event of a poor crop,”
Foner explains, “but oﬀered numerous opportunities for fraud on the part of
planters,” including charges for rations that exceeded the wages owed and
deductions from wages for poor work or other infractions.58 Under the terms
of many contracts, such infractions could include possessing “deadly weapons”
or “ardent spirits,” having visitors or leaving the plantation without permission,
52 See James Oakes, A Failure of Vision: The Collapse of the Freedmen’s Bureau Courts, 25 CIVIL
WAR HIST. 66, 68 (1979).
53 Id. at 70-73.
54 NIEMAN, supra note 39, at 163; Julie Novkov, Making Citizens of Freedmen and Polygamists, in
STATEBUILDING FROM THE MARGINS: BETWEEN RECONSTRUCTION AND THE NEW DEAL 32,
37-38 (Carol Nackenoﬀ & Julie Novkov eds., 2014).
55 FONER, supra note 38, at 165; NIEMAN, supra note 39, at 165; Sara Rapport, The Freedmen’s
Bureau as a Legal Agent for Black Men and Women in Georgia: 1865–1868, 73 GA. HIST. Q. 26, 32 (1989).
56 John C. Rodrigue, The Freedmen’s Bureau and Wage Labor in the Louisiana Sugar Region, in THE
FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND RECONSTRUCTION: RECONSIDERATIONS, supra note 35, at 193, 199.
57 FONER, supra note 38, at 165.
58 Id. at 172.
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denying the employer entry into the freedman’s cabin, or rendering anything
less than “perfect obedience.”59 Such terms were in clear contradiction to what
historian Tera Hunter has called African Americans’ “guiding assumption”
during this era: “that wage labor should not emulate slavery.”60
Had freed persons been able to cut their losses and walk away, the eﬀect
of such contract provisions would not have been as harsh, but planters were
determined to foreclose that option and the Bureau placed few obstacles in
their path. In 1865 and 1866, state legislatures throughout the South made
violation of a labor contract a crime; planters then turned to the Freedmen’s
Bureau for assistance in compelling speciﬁc performance.61 The Bureau’s
response is another example of the sometimes subtle ways in which this
agency gave meaning to the ﬂedgling Thirteenth Amendment. Some assistant
commissioners ordered freed persons to ﬁnish out their contracts or
incentivized them to do so with the threat of imprisonment or forced labor.62
These actions are noteworthy, for as legal scholar Lea VanderVelde has
argued, a plausible interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment—consistent
with Radical Republican ideology—was that it banned speciﬁc performance
of labor contracts.63 Other assistant commissioners declined to compel
speciﬁc performance, especially after Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, but still did less than they might have to support workers who
abandoned exploitive employers.64
The “‘compulsory’ system of ‘free’ labor”65 that the Bureau helped
establish has prompted searching questions from historians. In Eric Foner’s
words, “how ‘voluntary’ were labor contracts agreed to by blacks when they
were denied access to land, coerced by troops and Bureau agents if they refused
to sign, and fined or imprisoned if they struck for higher wages?”66 Foner

59 LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM SO LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 409
(1979); see also HANNAH ROSEN, TERROR IN THE HEART OF FREEDOM: CITIZENSHIP, SEXUAL
VIOLENCE, AND THE MEANING OF RACE IN THE POSTEMANCIPATION SOUTH 42 (2009) (noting
that in 1865, a Bureau oﬃcial in the Memphis area enhanced contractual restrictions on mobility by
forbidding “ferrymen from transporting freedpeople across the Mississippi River from Arkansas
into Memphis unless the prospective passengers carried a note from their employer authorizing
their travels”).
60 TERA W. HUNTER, TO ’JOY MY FREEDOM: SOUTHERN BLACK WOMEN’S LIVES AND
LABORS AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 27 (1997).
61 NIEMAN, supra note 39, at 173.
62 Id. at 173-76; see also SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 128 (describing how an assistant
commissioner in Texas ﬁned planters who enticed laborers to break Bureau-approved contracts, as
well as laborers who “allowed themselves to be enticed,” thereby “reviv[ing] a part of labor contract
law long since dead” in the United States).
63 VanderVelde, supra note 29, at 489-90.
64 FARMER-KAISER, supra note 37, at 76, 88-89; NIEMAN, supra note 39, at 173-76.
65 FARMER-KAISER, supra note 37, at 81.
66 FONER, supra note 38, at 166.

2019]

Administrative Constitutionalism at the Borders of Belonging

1617

posed this question in order to probe the Bureau’s commitment to the
principles of free labor, an ideology that helped inspire the Civil War and that
animated the project of Reconstruction. But his question also brings into focus
the concern of this Article: the Bureau’s witting or unwitting interpretation of
the Constitution. Bureau agents, by their actions and inactions, signaled that
certain labor arrangements did not amount to “involuntary servitude,” despite
ample indication that freed people felt otherwise.
Strong statements about the import of the Bureau’s constitutional
interpretations must await more research, keyed speciﬁcally to this question,
but at a minimum, the existing secondary literature suggests that these
interpretations had two lines of inﬂuence, one that ran through Congress and
the other that ran through the judiciary.
On the ﬁrst: In the months after ratiﬁcation, Congress was still
considering how to wield its enforcement authority under the Thirteenth
Amendment, and Bureau agents provided eyes and ears on the ground.
Senator Henry Wilson (a Republican from Massachusetts), for example,
referenced the work of the Freedmen’s Bureau when attempting to convince
his fellow Congressmen to annul state “black codes” that required employees
to forfeit all wages if they quit before the end of the contract term.67
Considered “odious” by the Freedmen’s Bureau, such laws surely merited the
attention of Congress, Wilson argued.68 By extension, the Bureau’s tolerance
of other coercive labor practices could well have sent the opposite message:
that such practices were not worthy of Congress’s attention, or were perhaps
even beyond its purview. The Anti-Peonage Act of 1867 is noteworthy here. In
enacting this law, Congress clarified that the labor system “known as peonage”
was unlawful; attempts to “establish, maintain, or enforce” that system were
punishable by fine and imprisonment.69 But the Act declined to deﬁne
“peonage” broadly (indeed, declined to deﬁne it at all, other than by reference
to the coercive, debt-based labor system that then existed in New Mexico
territory) and was silent as to a range of other exploitative labor practices.70
On the second line of inﬂuence, running through the courts: taken
cumulatively, the Bureau’s actions suggested a relatively restrictive reading of
the phrases “slavery” and “involuntary servitude.” Indeed, the Bureau’s
interpretations are consistent with a narrative in which, in the span of a few
decades, the courts squeezed out more capacious understandings of these

VanderVelde, supra note 29, at 462, 488, 492-93.
Id. at 493. For further evidence that members of Congress read and relied upon reports from
the Freedmen’s Bureau, see ROSEN, supra note 59, at 76, and Pamela Brandwein, Slavery as an
Interpretive Issue in the Reconstruction Congresses, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 315, 341 (2000).
69 Ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867).
70 Id.
67
68
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terms. In cases such as the Slaughter-House Cases71 and the Civil Rights Cases,72
litigants pushed for expansive interpretations of the Thirteenth
Amendment—ones that might guarantee “the rights of every man to the
fruits of his own labor” or authorize broad antidiscrimination legislation.73
The Court responded by anchoring the amendment’s meaning in the “shades
and conditions,” or “badges and incidents,” of racialized slavery,74 terms that,
in turn, took meaning from the Court’s invocation of classic master-andservant-type controls: “compuls[ion],” “restraint,” and legal “disability.”75
There is, however, at least one early case—regarding the indenture of
freed children—in which Bureau agents adopted a more generous reading of
the Thirteenth Amendment and invited an inﬂuential federal court judge to
do the same. This case thus provides an interesting twist to the story above.
Here, Bureau oﬃcials’ constitutional interpretation overlapped substantially
with that of their charges.
“As soon as blacks became free,” summarizes historian Barry Crouch,
“whites moved with dispatch to apprentice black children.”76 In doing so, they
relied on familiar tactics of coercion and manipulation, as well as new state
laws (part and parcel of the infamous Black Codes) created to assist planters
in reclaiming the labor of freed children. Often these statutes used the
seemingly benign language of stewardship, allowing former slave owners to
become the legal guardians of orphaned black youth, or of youth whose
parents failed to demonstrate industry and good habits.77 Other statutes
created mechanisms for identifying such children, by giving local magistrates
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
Brief for Plaintiﬀs on History, Object, Aim and Intent of the 13th, 14th and 15th
Amendments, and of Contemporaneous Legislation, The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
36 (1872) (No. 61), 1872 WL 15120, at *8-9.
74 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 69; The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20-21.
75 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22. Justice Harlan’s dissent oﬀers a glimpse of a diﬀerent
interpretive path. See id. at 33-38 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress’s power under the
Thirteenth Amendment “is not necessarily restricted to legislation against slavery as an institution
upheld by positive law, but may be exerted to the extent, at least, of protecting the liberated race
against discrimination in respect of legal rights belonging to freemen where such discrimination is
based upon race”).
76 Barry A. Crouch, ‘To Enslave the Rising Generation’: The Freedmen’s Bureau and the Texas Black
Code, in THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND RECONSTRUCTION: RECONSIDERATIONS, supra note
34, at 262, 267.
77 See, e.g., Apprentice Law of Mississippi, 1865, reprinted in MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL
FINKELMAN, 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 461 (2d ed.
2002) (making it the duty of civil oﬃcers to report to the probate court “all freedmen, free negroes,
and mulattoes, under the age of eighteen . . . who are orphans, or whose parent or parents have not
the means or who refuse to provide for and support” them, and making it the duty of the probate
court to order that the minors be “apprentice[d] . . . to some competent and suitable person,” with
priority given to the “former owner of said minors”).
71
72
73
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the power to seize freed children and assess whether their parents were
capable and suitable. Once bound out, children could expect to labor for their
“guardians” until they reached adulthood.78
Freed persons, especially freedwomen, routinely called on the Bureau to
release young relatives from such arrangements. In doing so, historian Mary
Farmer-Kaiser has argued, freedwomen advanced their own understanding of
freedom—one that included the reestablishment of their families and the right
to control their children’s labor. To be “free ourselves but deprived of our
children,” explained freedwoman Lucy Lee, was only a small improvement
over slavery.79 Their many complaints seem to have helped Bureau agents see
the evils of so-called apprenticeships. The practice “fosters the old ideas of
compulsory labor and dependence,” observed a Bureau agent in North Carolina
in early 1866.80 It was a “system of slavery,” masquerading behind the unfulfilled
promise of care and tutelage, agreed a Mississippi agent.81
This is not to say that Bureau agents never supported apprenticeship
arrangements, for in fact, they sometimes did—generally in cases involving
the children of poor, single mothers, and generally on the condition that
guardians provide a minimum level of education and service.82 In some cases,
Bureau agents themselves approved the apprenticeship contracts.83 In other
cases, however, Bureau agents stood up to planters, at personal peril, and
disallowed or voided indenture agreements. In some jurisdictions, they also
sought to make examples of prominent guardians by aiding freed persons
when they pursued their interests in court.84 There, they helped establish that
some indenture agreements, at least, violated the Thirteenth Amendment.

78 See generally id.; Rebecca J. Scott, The Battle over the Child: Child Apprenticeship and the Freedmen’s
Bureau in North Carolina, in GROWING UP IN AMERICA: CHILDREN IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
193, 193-98 (N. Ray Hiner & Joseph M. Hawes eds., 1985); see also FARMER-KAISER, supra note 37, at
99-100; KARIN L. ZIPF, LABOR OF INNOCENTS: FORCED APPRENTICESHIP IN NORTH CAROLINA,
1715–1919, at 40-83 (2005); Richard Paul Fuke, Planters, Apprenticeship, and Forced Labor: The Black Family
Under Pressure in Post-Emancipation Maryland, 62 AGRIC. HIST. 57, 62-68 (1988); J. Michael Rhyne,
“Conduct . . . Inexcusable and Unjustifiable”: Bound Children, Battered Freedwomen, and the Limits of
Emancipation in Kentucky’s Bluegrass Region, 42 J. SOC. HIST. 319, 324 (2008).
79 FARMER-KAISER, supra note 37, at 139-40 (quoting Lee as saying, “[O]ur condition is
bettered but little”).
80 Id. at 57.
81 Id. at 105; see also id. at 104-06 (collecting a number of similar observations); id. at 121-22
(describing agents’ eﬀorts to assist two mothers in reclaiming their children from indenture).
82 Id. at 108-18, 128-29; see also Scott, supra note 78, at 199-204 (describing the “case-by-case
judgments” Bureau agents made in these circumstances).
83 ZIPF, supra note 78, at 80 (noting that Freedmen’s Bureau agents in North Carolina
apprenticed hundreds of children, including in cases where there was no parental consent).
84 FARMER-KAISER, supra note 37, at 108, 121-26; see also Crouch, supra note 76, at 270-71
(describing the eﬀorts of some Bureau agents to “oppose[] binding as a county policy and opposing
the binding out of individual children); cf. SCHWALM, supra note 41, at 252-54 (documenting the
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The habeas corpus case In re Turner, decided by a federal circuit court in
Baltimore, Maryland, in 1867, testiﬁes to the Bureau’s inﬂuence.85 The case
involved a young woman, Elizabeth Turner, who had been apprenticed to her
former owner a mere two days after the abolition of slavery.86 In keeping with
Maryland’s new apprenticeship statute, the indenture contract for Turner
bore little resemblance to the contracts required for white children: Whereas
white children were to receive education in reading, writing, and arithmetic,
Turner had no such guarantees; her education would be in “the art or calling
of a house servant.”87 And unlike contracts for white children, Turner’s
allowed her to be “transferred at the will of [her] master to any person in the
same county.”88 With the assistance of two Freedmen’s Bureau lawyers, Henry
Stockbridge and Nathan Pusey, Turner’s family sought her release.89
According to historian W. Augustus Low, Stockbridge’s appointment to
the Bureau was speciﬁcally “to aid . . . in its ﬁght against the apprentice
system.”90 Stockbridge was a Radical Republican who, as early as May 1865,
had sought the aid of state courts in releasing black children from these
coerced contracts of service.91 In Turner’s case, where Stockbridge at last had
an audience with a federal judge, he took a strong stand.92 This sort of
apprenticeship was “an evasion of the constitutional amendment abolishing
slavery and involuntary servitude,” he argued to the presiding judge, U.S.
Supreme Court Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase. 93 He also reminded the Chief
Justice that “the [C]onstitution by its own powers executes itself,” signaling
that a favorable decision need not rest on the 1866 Civil Rights Act.94
Hardly a friend to slavery, Chief Justice Chase likely did not require much
convincing.95 In a case of ﬁrst impression, he accepted Stockbridge’s
invitation and declared Turner’s apprenticeship “involuntary servitude,
“usual[]” rule that “unless ‘improper treatment’ could be proven . . . , apprenticeships would stand,”
but also noting other, conﬂicting instructions that Bureau oﬃcials received).
85 In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (Chase, C.J.).
86 HAROLD M. HYMAN, THE RECONSTRUCTION JUSTICE OF SALMON P. CHASE: IN RE
TURNER AND TEXAS V. WHITE 120, 124-29 (1997).
87 In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 338 (describing the parties’ arguments in the case synopsis).
88 Id. at 339.
89 Id. at 338.
90 W. A. Low, The Freedmen’s Bureau and Civil Rights in Maryland, 37 J. NEGRO HIST. 221,
228 (1952).
91 Fuke, supra note 78, at 72.
92 See id. (noting that prior to the Turner case, Bureau agents in Maryland had “ﬂooded state
courts with applications for writs of habeas corpus” and been rebuﬀed; Chief Justice Chase’s
agreement to hear the Turner case while on federal circuit duty oﬀered a new and important
opportunity).
93 In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339 (case synopsis).
94 Id.
95 See generally JOHN NIVEN, SALMON P. CHASE: A BIOGRAPHY (1995) (describing Chase’s
long career as an opponent of slavery).

2019]

Administrative Constitutionalism at the Borders of Belonging

1621

within the meaning of these words in the [Thirteenth] [A]mendment.”96 As
a result, he determined, Turner must be released.97
In the short term, the Turner decision was of modest value to freed people.
It was an important statement of law, but enforcement required resources,
institutional capacity, and political will, all of which were in short supply in the
late 1860s. Maryland’s legally “moribund” apprenticeship system lingered on
for years.98
And yet In re Turner remains a landmark in constitutional law. In historian
Risa Goluboﬀ ’s words, it is a reminder of the Thirteenth Amendment’s
“expansive possibilities for establishing freedom and equality”99—even as, in
the words of another scholar, the Amendment’s judicially recognized meaning
“has shrunk to the size of an antebellum grave marker.”100 Administrators
from the Freedmen’s Bureau are implicated in both facets of this history.
III. CHINESE INSPECTORS AND THE MEANING OF DUE PROCESS
As Americans in former slaveholding states adjusted to the demise of the
legal institution of slavery and the reality of emancipation, those in the West
were also engaged in tense negotiations over race, citizenship, and nation—
negotiations that offer another example of administrative constitutionalism
in action.
As in the South, race and labor were central, but the conﬂict in the West
stemmed from a diﬀerent complex of factors: post–“Gold Rush” population
growth, including tens of thousands of immigrants from China; powerful
ideologies of white, Anglo-Saxon superiority and Asian inferiority; and, by
the early 1870s, a scarcity of jobs for unskilled laborers. Western nativists and
labor organizations pressured Congress to address what they called the
“Chinese problem,” resulting in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.101 The
Act suspended immigration of Chinese laborers, imposed criminal penalties
on those who aided or abetted such immigration, and prohibited Chinese
In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339.
Id.; HYMAN, supra note 86, at 120, 128-29.
BARBARA JEANNE FIELDS, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM ON THE MIDDLE GROUND:
MARYLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 153-56 (1985). But see Fuke, supra note 78, at 73
(noting that, according to Bureau sources, the Turner decision enabled Bureau agents in Maryland
to secure the release of most apprentices by the summer of 1868).
99 Risa Goluboﬀ, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50 DUKE L.J.
1609, 1637 (2001).
100 Lea VanderVelde, The Thirteenth Amendment of Our Aspirations, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 855,
860 (2007).
101 See LEE, supra note 26, at 23-46; see generally ENTRY DENIED: EXCLUSION AND THE
CHINESE COMMUNITY IN AMERICA, 1882–1943 (Sucheng Chan ed., 1991); SALYER, supra note 26;
BETH LEW-WILLIAMS, THE CHINESE MUST GO: VIOLENCE, EXCLUSION, AND THE MAKING
OF THE ALIEN IN AMERICA (2018).
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immigrants already in the country from obtaining U.S. citizenship.102 A series
of follow-on laws, such as the Geary Act of 1892, extended and reinforced the
exclusionist project.103
Federal administrators were primarily in charge of enforcing Chinese
exclusion, ﬁrst under the auspices of the U.S. Customs Service (within the
Treasury Department) and then, after 1903, via the Bureau of Immigration
(part of a newly created Department of Commerce and Labor).104 In carrying
out their duties, “Chinese inspectors” gave content to the abstract idea of due
process of law, as embodied in the Fifth Amendment. The Amendment, after
all, spoke of persons, not citizens, meaning that everyone who came into
contact with government authority arguably fell under its protection.105 An
open question was what process was due to Chinese immigrants, who sought
entry into the country for the same familial, political, and economic reasons
as non-Chinese immigrants, but whom the law now disfavored.
Historians agree that administrators at the nation’s primary points of entry
shared the anti-Chinese biases that permeated the West and that they were
deeply invested in the project of exclusion.106 In general, then, they processed
admissions cases “with skepticism, expecting the testimony to be
fraudulent.”107 They questioned applicants and their witnesses extensively,
with an eye toward prompting and probing inconsistencies.108 An interpreter
attended the proceedings, but was not always conversant in the applicant’s
dialect.109 And administrators generally refused to allow applicants’ lawyers or
friends to be present, lest they “coach[]” the applicant through the process.110

The Chinese Exclusion Act, Pub. L. No. 47-126, 22 Stat. 58, 59, 61 (1882).
See, e.g., Geary Act, Pub. L. No. 52-60, 27 Stat. 25 (1892) (providing for the arrest,
sentencing to hard labor, and removal of people of Chinese descent not lawfully in the United States,
and requiring lawful residents of Chinese origin to register with the Internal Revenue Service); see
also McCreary Amendment, Pub. L. No. 53-14, 28 Stat. 7 (1893) (further restricting the entry to and
movement within the United States of Chinese immigrants and persons of Chinese descent);
Immigration Act of 1891, Pub. L. No. 51-551, 26 Stat. 1084 (1891) (extending the exclusionary project
to categories of persons that an administrator might easily place a Chinese immigrant in, such as
“paupers or persons likely to become a public charge”); Scott Act, Pub. L. No. 50-1015, 25 Stat. 476
(1888) (further restricting entry of people of Chinese origin, including by preventing Chinese
laborers formerly in the United States from returning unless the laborer had a “lawful wife” or family
or owned property in the United State of at least one thousand dollars in value).
104 SALYER, supra note 26, at 18, 101-02; Kitty Calavita, The Paradoxes of Race, Class, Identity,
and “Passing”: Enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 1882–1910, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 5 (2000).
105 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”).
106 LEE, supra note 26, at 48.
107 SALYER, supra note 26, at 59.
108 Id. at 59-60.
109 Id. at 62.
110 Id. at 61-62.
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After the administrator had made a decision on the case, an attorney was
allowed to intercede, but days, or even months, might pass in the meantime.111
These patterns reﬂect choices about how Chinese immigrants deserved to
be treated, and these choices were constitutional in nature. Chinese
immigrants said as much—repeatedly and forcefully. With the help of savvy
advocates and lawyers, Chinese immigrants ﬁled thousands of habeas corpus
petitions in the decades after 1882, questioning the legality of exclusion
policies and demanding that administrative procedures respect applicants’
rights under the Constitution.112 Some cases made it all the way to the U.S.
Supreme Court, resulting in important pronouncements about the rights and
legal status of immigrants writ large.113
The regular involvement of courts in this episode of constitutional history
might make it seem like a poor example of administrative constitutionalism:
arguably, administrators were simply implementing the courts’ constitutional
interpretations, and to the extent that administrators innovated, Chinese
habeas petitioners ensured that the courts checked administrators’ work. Two
features of this history undermine that argument. First, administrative
practices shaped how judges engaged with the concept of due process, as well
as how judges thought about the interpretive stakes. In case after case,
government lawyers defended the summary procedures that administrators
used and suggested the devastating implications of greater procedural
protections.114 Such narratives cast due process not as a sacred AngloAmerican tradition but as a weapon of determined and unscrupulous
foreigners—a weapon to be carefully guarded.115
Second, courts were hardly keeping a tight rein over this particular clause
of the Constitution. Indeed, the gist of the courts’ decisions over time was to
give immigration oﬃcials more interpretive power, not less, at least in
111 Id. at 62-63. In deportation cases involving Chinese immigrants, courts retained greater
control over the meaning of “due process,” but administrators remained inﬂuential. See infra note
119, note 124 & accompanying text.
112 Christian G. Fritz, A Nineteenth Century “Habeas Corpus Mill”: The Chinese Before the Federal
Courts in California, 32 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 347, 347-49, 354 (1988); see also SALYER, supra note 26, at
74 (reproducing “[o]ne of the thousands” of habeas petitions ﬁled during this period, on a
“standardized form” that suggests that such petitions were ﬁled in great numbers).
113 As examples of particularly important decisions, see United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253
(1905); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 229 (1896); Wong Wing v. United States, 163
U.S. 228 (1896); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); and Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). For other noteworthy decisions, see Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259
U.S. 276 (1922); Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460 (1912); Chin Yow v. United States, 208
U.S. 8 (1908); Chin Bak Kan v. United States, 186 U.S. 193 (1902); United States v. Sing Tuck, 194
U.S. 161 (1904); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895); and Chew Heong v. United
States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884).
114 SALYER, supra note 26, at 170-216.
115 Id.
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decisions involving procedural fairness for non-citizens. In the four decades
following the inauguration of Chinese exclusion, challenges to admission and
deportation decisions established that “aliens enjoyed constitutional rights
only at the suﬀerance of Congress,” to use historian Lucy Salyer’s words.116
This followed from the Supreme Court’s ﬁnding that Congress possessed
“plenary power” over immigration—a power that the text of the Constitution
did not make explicit but that the justices now deemed an essential attribute
of a sovereign nation. The practical upshot of this ﬁnding was that whatever
vestigial constitutional rights detained immigrants had were left to
administrators to enforce—or not.117
The Supreme Court displayed greater caution when it came to Chinese
admission-seekers who claimed to be citizens, having recognized in previous
cases that citizens and non-citizens were diﬀerently situated vis-à-vis the
Constitution. But nonetheless the Court initially rejected litigants’ demand
that judges, rather than agencies, be the ultimate arbiter of the fact of
citizenship.118 In doing so, the Court also implicitly endorsed administrators’
fact-ﬁnding procedures—which fell well short of a judicial trial. Where the
administrator was acting within powers conferred by Congress, Justice
Holmes explained in the 1905 Ju Toy case, the administrator’s decision “is due
process of law.”119 It was a bold pronouncement and likely inconsistent with the
Id. at 53.
Id. at 53-58, 216, 248. Key cases in this vein are Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 714, which held
that “Congress, having the right, as it may see ﬁt, to expel aliens of a particular class, or to permit
them to remain, has undoubtedly the right to provide a system of registration and identiﬁcation,”
and Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892), which held that, as to the admission of
“foreigners who have never been naturalized, nor acquired any domicil or residence within the
United States, nor even been admitted into the country pursuant to law,” “the decisions of executive
or administrative oﬃcers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of
law.” Some cases toward the end of this period made clear that, at least in deportation proceedings,
aliens were entitled to a fair opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., Chin Yow, 208 U.S. at 11 (implying
that denial of “a fair opportunity” to produce evidence would constitute a sound basis for a habeas
corpus petition). But fairness remained largely a matter for Congress (and thus, in practice, for
administrators) to deﬁne. See, e.g., Low Wah Suey, 225 U.S. at 469-70, 471-72 (rejecting the argument
that denial of counsel at deportation hearings violated due process). The precise scope of the plenary
power remains a live question among courts and legal scholars.
118 See Ju Toy, 198 U.S. at 263 (citing Nishimura Ekiu and Fong Yue Ting to support holding that
executive oﬃcers were competent to hear citizenship disputes and that even for persons who claimed
citizenship, “due process of law does not require a judicial trial”); Kristin A. Collins, Bureaucracy as
the Border: Administrative Law and the Citizen Family, 66 DUKE L.J. 1727, 1729 (2017) (highlighting
the signiﬁcance of allowing administrators to serve as the gatekeepers of citizenship, by documenting
“the role played by administrators in developing practices, policies, statutes, and constitutional
understandings that have governed recognition of the parent-child relationship for the purpose of
resolving claims to citizenship and immigration status”).
119 Ju Toy, 198 U.S. at 263 (emphasis added); see also SALYER, supra note 26, at 113-14 (classifying
Ju Toy as a departure from prior immigration decisions because it “appeared to blur the distinction
between aliens and citizens and to subject both to the same bureaucratic discretion and authority”).
116
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intentions of the Constitution’s framers, as legal scholar Thomas Reed Powell
noted in 1907, but the perceived “horde of immigrants on the frontier” provided
ready justification for a decision that might otherwise appear “monstrous.”120
The Supreme Court eventually moved away from aspects of the Ju Toy
decision. In 1908, the Court clariﬁed that a Chinese admission-seeker who
claimed to be a U.S. citizen was entitled to a fair hearing, albeit a “summary”
one, and that if immigration authorities provided “nothing but the semblance
of a hearing,” a federal court could revisit the merits of the case.121 In the
context of deportation—which courts treated as a much more severe action
than exclusion—the Court went further. In a 1922 case involving two
residents who claimed to be China-born sons of native-born citizens, Justice
Brandeis deemed the fact of citizenship an “essential jurisdictional” one,
meaning that the petitioners were entitled to a judicial determination of that
fact, even absent any procedural irregularities below.122
And yet in other regards, Ju Toy remained “good law”—and remains so
today, along with many other judicial pronouncements from the Chinese
exclusion context. The day-to-day administrative practices that informed
those decisions thus mattered greatly. And as legal historian Lucy Salyer has
demonstrated, these practices “deviated signiﬁcantly from the norms of due
process elaborated in Anglo-American jurisprudence.”123
As for how, and to whom, that deviation mattered, the eﬀects are clearest
in the realm of immigration, but not conﬁned to immigrants from China. In
the decades after the Chinese exclusion era, immigrants of all nationalities
struggled to establish that the Fifth Amendment required something more
than what administrators had accorded Chinese litigants at the turn of the
twentieth century.124
120 Thomas Reed Powell, Conclusiveness of Administrative Determinations in the Federal
Government, 1 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583, 605 (1907) (quoted in Gabriel Chin, Regulating Race: Asian
Exclusion and the Administrative State, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 1, 61 (2002)).
121 Chin Yow, 208 U.S. at 11, 12.
122 Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 284. In issuing this holding, the Court emphasized a fact that
arguably narrowed the decision’s reach: both petitioners had presented evidence that was suﬃcient
(if believed) to prove their claims of citizenship. Id. at 282, 284-85. A case from a decade later—
Crowell v Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)—provided a clearer statement of what is now taken for granted:
that citizenship is a “jurisdictional fact,” which courts must be allowed to determine. Mark Tushnet,
The Story of Crowell: Grounding the Administrative State, in FEDERAL COURT STORIES 259, 387-88
(Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik, eds. 2010).
123 SALYER, supra note 26, at 136.
124 See Gabriel J. Chin, Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting: The Origins of Plenary Power, in
IMMIGRATION STORIES 7, 21-23 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005) (noting
continuing eﬀects of the Chinese exclusion cases, including the holdings that “for noncitizens, living
in the United States is a privilege rather than a right” and that “deportation is not punishment”);
Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its
Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 854-63 (1987) (describing the extension of the reasoning of the
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), to cases involving other immigrant groups and other
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Legal scholar Gabriel Chin has extended the argument further, to all
persons, immigrant and otherwise, who found themselves in conflict with
an administrative agency. The scant procedural protections that the
Supreme Court approved in the immigration context set a more general
“due process threshold” for the administrative state, Chin explains.125
“[W]hen Congress wants to grant administrators the discretion to work
without oversight, the constitutional minimum is still set in many respects
by the Asian Exclusion cases.”126
Historians hint at still another way in which this episode of administrative
constitutionalism matters: it affected the worldviews and practices of Chinese
immigrants who did make it through the gates, even legitimately. In the
decades after 1882, “Chinese immigrants and residents . . . often lived a
shadowed existence,” explains historian Erika Lee.127 Aware of their legal
vulnerabilities, they were “constantly anxious about their immigration status,
about harassment by immigration officials . . . , and about their personal safety
in general.”128
This “psychology of fear” spilled over into the lives of native-born Chinese
American citizens129—and not without reason. Historian Mae Ngai estimates
that at least twenty-five percent of the Chinese American population in 1950
was unlawfully present.130 This itself was a legacy of administrative action, at
least in part. Faced with hostile immigration inspectors, ever-heightening
evidentiary standards, and little hope of meaningful judicial review, Chinese
admission-seekers had turned the immigration bureaucracy’s own procedures
against it: they drew on evidence supplied in prior successful admission cases
to craft elaborate, ﬁctitious family histories.131 Between 1920 and 1940, over

contexts); Natsu Taylor Saitu, The Enduring Eﬀect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The “Plenary Power”
Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L.J. 13, 17-29 (2003) (describing courts’
ongoing recognition of Congress’ plenary power to regulate borders and applications of this power
in situations involving refugees, suspected terrorists, Native nations, and U.S. territories). Savvy
litigants shifted their attention away from the Constitution and focused on statutory interpretation
instead. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional
Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 601 (1990).
125 Gabriel Chin, Regulating Race: Asian Exclusion and the Administrative State, 37 HARV. C.R.C.L.L. REV. 1, 25 (2002).
126 Id. He elaborates on this argument by documenting the inﬂuence of the Asian exclusion
cases on four important areas: (1) the constitutionality of ﬁnal administrative factﬁnding and (2)
exceptions to ﬁnal administrative factﬁnding; (3) the requirement that litigants exhaust
administrative remedies; and (4) the permissibility of administrative punishment. See id.
127 LEE, supra note 26, at 229.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 237, 238.
130 Mae M. Ngai, Legacies of Exclusion: Illegal Chinese Immigration During the Cold War Years, 18
J. AM. ETHNIC HIST. 3, 3 (1998).
131 NGAI, supra note 26, at 204-06; Ngai, supra note 130, at 6.
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71,000 Chinese entered the U.S. as China-born sons of American citizens,
and many of these claims were fraudulent (they were “paper sons”).132
During the mid-1950s, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
helped thousands of Chinese Americans “confess” to their crimes and gain
legal status, as part of a broader federal government campaign to eliminate
“paper immigration,” but in doing so, Ngai argues, they “reproduced
racialized perceptions that all Chinese immigrants were illegal and
dangerous.”133 This only lent further credence to one of the Chinese
inspectors’ most important legal interpretations: that although the
Constitution’s reach extends to all persons within the nation’s jurisdiction, its
protections may be weakened or denied to those who threaten dominant
visions of the ideal national community.134
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM
AS AN “ARENA OF STRUGGLE”
The examples in Parts II and III are a sample of what historians have to
oﬀer the study of administrative constitutionalism. I hope they inspire legal
scholars to read more deeply in the scholarship that historians have crafted
from administrative records. I would not want to imply, however, that legal
scholars can turn to historians for insight into whatever constitutional
provision captures their interest, or that I chose my examples at random.
Over the past few generations, historians have been deeply invested in
understanding what Barbara Welke calls the “borders of belonging”—the
changing set of meanings ascribed to particular aspects of individual identity,
such as race, gender, and ability, and the consequences of those meanings for
individuals’ ability to participate in society.135 Law is intimately related to
these borders of belonging, for law both shapes meaning and creates
consequences. In this regard, the Bill of Rights and Reconstruction
Amendments may be the most important law there is. These amendments
have long served as a touchstone for marginalized and excluded groups,
oﬀering them tools for demanding greater freedom and equality. At the same
NGAI, supra note 26, at 205; Ngai, supra note 130, at 4.
NGAI, supra note 26, at 223; see also id. at 218-21 (providing background on the INS
confession program).
134 For another interesting historical example of administrative constitutionalism in the
immigration context, see Bonnie Honig, Bound by Law? Alien Rights, Administrative Discretion, and
the Politics of Technicality: Lessons from Louis Post and the First Red Scare, in THE LIMITS OF LAW 209,
215 (Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas & Martha Merrill Humphrey eds., 2005), which recounts the
story of former Assistant Secretary of Labor Louis F. Post, who, in the context of the Palmer Raids,
“applied to administrative cases standards of evidence and due process that normally would have
been thought at the time to obtain only in judicial settings, not administrative ones”).
135 WELKE, supra note 12, at 4.
132
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time, these amendments have sometimes functioned to preserve the status
quo. Invoked by those in power, they have said, “wait your turn,” “don’t take
mine,” and “trust the system.” Indeed, Welke credits the Supreme Court’s
“narrow, nugatory interpretation” of the Reconstruction Amendments in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with “thwart[ing] a politics of
human rights.”136 Agencies are part of that story, too, just as they are part of
the Court’s resuscitation of those amendments decades later.137
By asking scholars of administrative constitutionalism to engage more with
historical work, including on periods preceding the rise of the modern
administrative state, I am thus taking a particular stance. I am not simply
offering scholars a means of expanding their archive, but encouraging them to
expand the archive in a particular way. I am asking for greater attention to
people on the margins—people who are often the subject of regulation but
whose voices and concerns are less likely to make it into an agency’s formal
legal pronouncements or a top administrator’s testimony before Congress.
And I am asking scholars to consider, as systematically as possible, who has
reaped the benefits of administrative constitutionalism and who has borne
the burdens.
At a time when the concept of administrative governance is highly
politicized, with some commentators rushing to the defense of the
administrative state and others attacking it, such a position may seem
imprudent.138 The work I am asking for might add fuel to this ﬁre, by
suggesting that administrative interpretations of the Constitution have
tended to skew in one direction or another.
But I have my sights on another problem: the prospect of the ﬁeld of
administrative constitutionalism replicating administrative law scholarship
more generally—ever attentive to congressional and judicial constraints on
agency behavior and, increasingly, to the complexities of day-to-day
administrative decisionmaking,139 but only obliquely concerned with
distribution (aside from a general assumption that “agency capture” exists and
Id. at 142.
On the “resuscitation” part of the story, see generally GOLUBOFF, supra note 3; LEE, supra
note 2; and Tani, supra note 4.
138 See, e.g., Gillian Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Foreword: 1930s Redux: The
Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (2017) (noting a trend of “antiadministrativism” in some recent opinions of the current Supreme Court).
139 For recent examples of important empirical work on what agencies do and why, see Jennifer
Nou & Edward H. Stiglitz, Regulatory Bundling, 128 YALE L.J. 1174 (2019); Nicholas R. Parrillo,
Federal Agency Guidance and the Power to Bind: An Empirical Study of Agencies and Industries, 36 YALE
J. REG. 165 (2019); Amy Semet, An Empirical Examination of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 103
MINN. L. REV. 2255 (2019); and Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the Compliance
Era, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 369 (2019). The critique I raise here does not diminish the contributions
of careful empirical research.
136
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must be guarded against).140 Here, I mean distribution in the broadest
sense—of not only material resources, but also opportunity, risk, and power.
At the end of the day, when we look at the actual work of administrative
agencies and the way that other legal institutions have (or have not)
constrained them, who has gotten what? And at what cost? Further, do those
distributions map onto familiar lines of inclusion and exclusion (race, gender,
sexuality, ability, national origin, class)?141 In my opinion, too few selfdescribed scholars of administrative law are asking these critical questions
(although perhaps times are changing).142
Scholars of administrative constitutionalism ought to do better, not least
because of the high political and cultural stakes of decisions involving the
Constitution.143 “[A] signal feature of American constitutional history,”
historian Hendrik Hartog wrote in 1987, in a landmark essay, is “the
passionate insistence of various groups that the Constitution must be (in
other words, must be made to be) a recognition and an expression of legitimate
aspirations.”144 According to Hartog, past actors routinely read into the
Constitution messages that, at the time, looked “subversive and disruptive

140 Nicholas Bagley advances this argument forcefully and persuasively in his recent article The
Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). See also Richard L. Revesz, Regulation and
Distribution, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489, 1500-01, 1578 (2018) (challenging the “orthodox view” among
academics that regulatory policy should not take into account distributional consequences and
aspiring to “ﬁll th[e] void” created by “decades” of inattention).
141 In foregrounding these questions, I take inspiration from Barbara Welke’s call for a history
of the administrative state that is alert to the importance of “fundamentally abled, racialized, and
gendered borders of belonging.” WELKE, supra note 12, at 146.
142 For examples of administrative law scholarship that I think does engage these questions,
see Wendy A. Bach, Welfare Reform, Privatization and Power: Reconfiguring Administrative Law
Structures from the Ground Up, 74 BROOKLYN L. REV. 275 (2008); Bagley, supra note 140; Ming Hsu
Chen, Governing by Guidance: Civil Rights Agencies and the Emergence of Language Rights, 49 HARV.
C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 291 (2014); Chin, supra note 124; Collins, supra note 118; Blake Emerson, The
Claims of Oﬃcial Reason: Administrative Guidance on Social Inclusion, 128 YALE L.J. 2122 (2019);
Grossman, supra note 5; Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality
Directives in American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339 (2012); Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Overreach and
Innovation in Equality Regulation, 66 DUKE L.J. 1771 (2017); David Pozen, Freedom of Information
Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097 (2017); Revesz, supra note 140; Bertrall
L. Ross II, Administering Suspect Classes, 66 DUKE L.J. 1807 (2017); Mila Sohoni, On Dollars and
Deference: Agencies, Spending, and Economic Rights, 66 DUKE L.J. 1677 (2017); and Karen M. Tani, An
Administrative Right To Be Free from Sexual Violence? Title IX Enforcement in Historical and Institutional
Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1847 (2017).
143 For another take on why we need administrative constitutionalism scholarship that engages
the insights of critical legal scholarship, see Yxta Maya Murray, What FEMA Should Do After Puerto
Rico: Toward Critical Administrative Constitutionalism, 72 ARK. L. REV. 165 (2019), which argues that
a “critical administrative constitutionalism” perspective could be incorporated into administrative
practice in a way that would help agencies live up to their constitutional obligations.
144 Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and “The Rights That Belong to Us All,” 74 J.
AM. HIST. 1013, 1014 (1987) (emphasis added).
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and utopian.”145 They saw in that document messages about the duty of public
authorities to destroy structures of hierarchy and oppression; messages about
the meaning of equality–who was equal to whom, and what that equivalence
meant; and messages about which rights and freedoms trumped others.146
Today, some of these once-radical messages are widely accepted as
constitutional truths. Other messages have never been incorporated into
constitutional doctrine, but remain alive—vying, still, for recognition. Their
endurance reminds us that, in any era, constitutional interpretation is “an arena
of struggle.”147
As the administrative constitutionalism literature grows and matures, we
should remember this long American tradition of constitutional struggle. We
should analyze administrators as not simply interpreters but arbiters—
mediators of contending constitutional visions. We should pay attention to
whose constitutional aspirations gained legitimacy as they came into contact
with the administrative state, and whose suﬀered humiliation and defeat. We
should investigate what consequences followed. Engagement with historians
is crucial to this end.

145
146
147

Id. at 1017.
See id. at 1020.
Id. at 1026.

